Matt Taibbi has posted a newsletter edition in which he complains about what he calls a “just-released On the Media episode” about free speech — but I think the episode, which you can find here, merely re-posts an episode from two years ago. (Probably? I don’t have time to do a comparative listening.) I only want to make a brief comment, in two points.

One: Marantz thinks that Richard Rorty, whom he admires, was an “analytical philosopher” until the 1990s, but Rorty made his definitive break with analytic philosophy in his 1979 book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Marantz’s fuzzy sense of the shape of Rorty’s career is matched by his cringe-makingly fuzzy sense of what Rorty meant by “contingency” and what he was arguing in his late and explicitly political work. If you want to get a sense of what Rorty actually thought, from someone whose politics are probably pretty close to Marantz’s, read this 2012 essay by Charles Marsh. (Charles and I were grad students at UVA together, he in Religion and me in English, when Rorty joined the faculty. I got to know Rorty a little bit; Charles knew him much better.) Rorty is definitely an important, though not an infallible, thinker for our moment, and it’s worth approaching him via a reliable guide. Of course, best of all would be to read him directly! — but please don’t focus only on the decontextualized passages that went viral when Trump was elected.

Two: — and this is a more important point, for me anyway — Marantz has no idea what Mill argued in On Liberty. For instance, Marantz says, “In his book, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues for one simple principle — the harm principle. It amounts to this: the state, my neighbors and everyone else should let me get on with my life as long as I don’t harm anyone in the process. One way of thinking of this is my freedom to swing my fist, ends at the tip of your nose. Mill favors free speech too, up to the point where it inflames violence. But merely causing offence, he thinks, is no grounds for intervention. Because in his view, that is not a harm.” Nope. Nopenopenope.

Throughout On Liberty, Mill has very little — almost nothing — to say about physical harm. He is much more interested in (real or potential) moral harm. Being a serious thinker, he makes a series of distinctions. For instance, he distinguishes between the kinds of actions that deserve legal punishment from those that deserve social opprobrium. You would never know it from Marantz, but Mill thinks there are circumstances in which a person who hasn’t violated any laws should still suffer “moral reprobation” and even a kind of social punishment:

What I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others, are the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concerns his own good, but which does not affect the interests of others in their relations with him. Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment. Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury — these are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment.

And notice another thing about that passage: when speaking of “acts injurious to others” Mill is not thinking of fists striking noses but rather of “falsehood or duplicity” and even “selfish abstinence from defending them against injury”!

Furthermore, Mill advocates for legal limits on speech itself in terms that even the more censorious among us might approve: “An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard.” (This is Mill’s version of the doctrine of “fighting words.”)

Mill is a much more sophisticated and nuanced figure that either his celebrants or enemies think. I wish people would stop using him as cudgels in their culture wars and read him with care.