Yesterday I stopped at the McDonald’s in Burnet, Texas, and the young man who brought me my food said “Here is your luncheon, kind sir!“
Religions are as significant for what they leave unmapped and open to the imagination in the supernatural world as for what they rule on definitively – and religions are often pretty bad at drawing definitive conclusions beyond their core tenets. So I don’t see religious faith as a bar to being very curious and open-minded about high strangeness, and to adopting an agnostic attitude to speculative claims about the supernatural. But ‘organised woo’ is rather different. Like fundamentalist materialism, it is organised around the core principle that everything can and should be explained. That is not, in and of itself, a bad aspiration – genuine curiosity is arguably sustained by the conviction that an answer can, in theory, ultimately be attained. But in reality the belief that everything can and should be explained, harmless in itself, elides into an excessive confidence in available explanations. It becomes a pigeonholing exercise, on the implied assumption that our current state of knowledge can account for everything; or, in the case of ‘organised woo’, it becomes a process of inventing new pigeonholes for weird experiences to go in. The fundamentalist materialist and the occultist systematiser may seem at diametrically opposed ends of the epistemological spectrum, but they are more similar than either would care to admit – for they are both uncomfortable with doubt, with the unexplained, and with free-floating weirdness.
I’ll be making good use of the phrase “organised woo.”
I like to think that the imaginary crowd has a similar salutary effect on more complex thoughts. The audience does more than just make me imagine I might be wrong. It invites me to consider, from the diverse perspective of the audience members, the multiple dimensions along which I might be wrong.
Phenomena like these mean that thinking is never really a solitary activity. It is fundamentally social. Even when we are talking to ourselves we are using the socially orientated mechanisms of language to externalise our thoughts and feed them back “into” our minds.
Someone should write a book about this idea that thinking is “fundamentally social”! Oh wait.
I tried to log in to Bluesky the other day and was told that, because I live in Texas, I have to verify my age through some process Bluesky does not explain, though it is clear that the process involves some third-party site that might or might not be a reliable custodian of … well, of whatever information it demands. The page also said that if I don’t want to verify my age I can delete my Bluesky account. In the extremely vague circumstances that seemed the best option.
What is the very pinnacle of American music? I can answer that question: it’s this.
- Possibly Richard Rodgers’s most gorgeous melody (which is saying a great deal)
- Lorenz Hart’s masterpiece of a lyric, at once funny and heartrending
- The elegant and tasteful arrangement by Buddy Bregman
- And a vocal performance to die for by the incomparable Ella
There’s nothing to match it.
Here is the first in a series of four essays on the Second World War: Why has it been so central to the American imagination for so long? And how much longer will that centrality last?
Freddie on “Our Poptimist Dystopia":
Aesthetic hierarchy of any kind has become the last obscenity, the one judgment we’re no longer permitted to make, because to say that one thing is better than another is to admit that better exists. And if better exists out there, in the world of songs and books and movies, then it exists out here for us too, in the world of our lives, and that way lies the intolerable thought that we might have gone too easy on ourselves. Anti-elitism is the snobbery of those who have decided that the glory of great art is not worth bearing the thought that someone else might have better taste than we do. So we haven’t democratized taste; we abolished it so no one ever has to come in second, so that no one ever must face the implied judgment of other people’s preferences.