adjusting expectations

One thing we’ve learned over the past few years is that lawyers who are good on social media and television aren’t necessarily good in the courtroom. In fact, the very traits that make a good media lawyer — bold assertiveness, hardass rhetoric, creativity with insults — not only don’t work in the courtroom, they are often forbidden in the courtroom. People watch a lawyer perform on TV and think “Wow, I wish I could get that guy to represent me” — well, be careful what you wish for. Hire a lawyer in haste, repent at leisure — in an orange jumpsuit. 

But there’s another side to this distinction, one that works in favor of defendants, not against them: People are convicted all the time in the court of social media opinion who would never be convicted in a courtroom. In jury trials, the defense attorney only has to get one holdout. Another way to think about that, in relation to a very famous defendant: around 35% of Americans strongly support Donald Trump, while a single juror is only 8% of a jury. If you’re Donald Trump’s defense attorney and the prosecutor has an iron-clad case against your client, you only need to have gotten one diehard Trump supporter — probably someone smart enough or devious enough to disguise his or her passion — onto the jury, and your guy walks. 

And that’s if the prosecution has an ironclad case. What if the case isn’t ironclad? What if there’s room for doubt? Then you don’t even need a Trump supporter: you just need one person to take seriously what the judge tells the jury about our legal system’s presumption of innocence. Moreover, as Ken White has explained, prosecutors have to prove, not just suggest, that Trump explicitly intended to overthrow a legal election, not that he ranted and raved, or that he had a reckless disregard for truth. Everyone, including his strongest supporters, knows that he has a reckless disregard for truth, but that’s not a crime. And, given his long history of refusing to allow any significant duscussions to be put in writing, he may well be able to make a strong case that he was only acting on advice of counsel. (A defendant who makes such a plea gives up attorney-client privilege, but if nothing is in writing, then that may not hurt him. We’d just end up with conflicting bald assertions. Former attorney says X, former client says not-X.) 

This is why prosecutors offer plea deals: Jury trials are a kind of judicial Russian roulette. They will not want to offer any plea deals to Donald Trump, but in the end I suspect that that’s what they’ll do. And I also suspect that Trump will refuse to accept the deal, preferring take his chances in court. 

So, to people who read the news and see all these co-conspirators copping pleas and think that justice is finally coming for Orange Man: maybe you should adjust your expectations? Like you, there’s nothing (aside from peace in the Middle East) that I’d more like to see than Donald Trump cleaning toilets in prison. But unlike you, I don’t believe it will happen. Based on my understanding of the actual law, not how things are discussed on social media, I figure that there’s less than a 15% chance of his ever being convicted of anything, and a near-zero chance that he’ll ever serve time. Alas. 

Damon Krukowski: “Bandcamp may be a small fraction of the music industry as a whole – digital downloads currently account for only 3% of recorded music revenues, according to the RIAA – but for independent artists like us and those we share bills with on tour, Bandcamp is not only a meaningful source of income, but one of the last online channels we have to communicate directly with our audience. Unmediated by algorithms, unencumbered by ads, untainted by data mining, the site is a throwback to an earlier paradigm.”

I wrote (several years ago, but just now posted) about the wayfaring mind.

the wayfaring mind

What follows is a talk I gave some years ago at Smith College. It weaves together some common threads in my work, and draws on some previous published stuff — for instance, the Introduction to my book of essays Wayfaring. I was chatting with a friend the other day when I remembered something I wrote in this piece, and did a quick internet search because I couldn’t remember where I had published it. But nothing turned up. I am now thinking that I never did publish it — perhaps because I thought that it has too much recycled material? I dunno. So I’m posting it here. 


The essay is a representational genre, and what it represents is the movement of the mind across ideas, experiences, and sensations. The mind broods over these waters, restlessly, unpredictably, with a kind of Brownian motion. E. B. White once wrote, “The essayist arises in the morning and, if he has work to do, selects his garb from an unusually extensive wardrobe: he can pull on any sort of shirt, be any sort of person — philosopher, scold, jester, raconteur, confidant, pundit, devil’s advocate, enthusiast.” This description encourages and comforts, but it’s wrong. It would be more truthful if White had added that the essayist experiences during the course of the day unplanned and unwanted changes of clothing: you look down to smooth your philosopher’s robes and find that you’re now wearing the jester’s motley. The bells of your cap tinkle as you lower your head.

William Hazlitt’s essay “On the Pleasure of Hating” begins with a semi-comical account of the writer’s encounter with a spider which disgusts him but which he magnanimously refuses to kill. “We do not tread upon the poor little animal in question (that seems barbarous and pitiful!) but we regard it with a sort of mystic horror and superstitious loathing. It will ask another hundred years of fine writing and hard thinking to cure us of the prejudice and make us feel towards this ill-omened tribe with something of ‘the milk of human kindness,’ instead of their own shyness and venom.” But by the end of the essay this is what Hazlitt’s eccentric meditation on his — our — foibles has come to:

Seeing all this as I do, and unravelling the web of human life into its various threads of meanness, spite, cowardice, want of feeling, and want of understanding, of indifference towards others, and ignorance of ourselves, — seeing custom prevail over all excellence, itself giving way to infamy — mistaken as I have been in my public and private hopes, calculating others from myself, and calculating wrong; always disappointed where I placed most reliance; the dupe of friendship, and the fool of love; — have I not reason to hate and to despise myself? Indeed I do; and chiefly for not having hated and despised the world enough.

There would have been no way to see this coming from the opening anecdote; perhaps Hazlitt, when he sat down to write, hadn’t seen it coming either. (Yet note how the bitter comment on “unravelling the web of human life” evokes the spider with which the essay began.) We can after a fashion tell our minds how to think, and what to think about, but they seldom obey, and the essay as a genre forms a great long chronicle of their habitual disobedience. 

But in any given essay we can only bear so much of this — as the early listeners of Wagner were often agitated by his propensity to leave certain chords unresolved, keys ambiguous, readers want their prose pieces to add up to something, to have a clear point or purpose, and ideally an identifiable story. This is the primary reason why true essays are rarely long. The longest one I know, and perhaps the finest in the English language, is Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own. To speak of beginnings again, I’ll note that she opens with an account of her puzzlement when asked to speak on “women and fiction”:

I sat down on the banks of a river and began to wonder what the words meant. They might mean simply a few remarks about Fanny Burney; a few more about Jane Austen; a tribute to the Brontës and a sketch of Haworth Parsonage under snow; some witticisms if possible about Miss Mitford; a respectful allusion to George Eliot; a reference to Mrs Gaskell and one would have done. But at second sight the words seemed not so simple. The title women and fiction might mean, and you may have meant it to mean, women and what they are like, or it might mean women and the fiction that they write; or it might mean women and the fiction that is written about them, or it might mean that somehow all three are inextricably mixed together and you want me to consider them in that light. But when I began to consider the subject in this last way, which seemed the most interesting, I soon saw that it had one fatal drawback. I should never be able to come to a conclusion. I should never be able to fulfil what is, I understand, the first duty of a lecturer to hand you after an hour’s discourse a nugget of pure truth to wrap up between the pages of your notebooks and keep on the mantelpiece for ever.

Woolf tells her kind inviters that she cannot achieve the task they set her: he thoughts could not be shaped into a lecture, with its “nugget of pure truth” to keep on the mantelpiece, but could only be an essay — a curiously misshapen thing, continually altering and re-forming according to … well, according to what? According to the conditions of the moment, both internal and external: an excited or downcast mind, a lively or enervated body — how well did you sleep last night? — surroundings that are peaceful and quiet or throbbing with positive energy or afflicted by multiple tensions. Thought is always moved by these chemical and muscular and environmental forces, and therefore so is the essay itself.

In addition to being perhaps the finest English essay, A Room of One’s Own offers the best demonstration I know of how essayistic thinking actually happens. Having received her assignment, Woolf, as she has already told us, “sat down on the banks of a river and began to wonder.” A little later, she writes,

Thought — to call it by a prouder name than it deserved — had let its line down into the stream. It swayed, minute after minute, hither and thither among the reflections and the weeds, letting the water lift it and sink it until — you know the little tug — the sudden conglomeration of an idea at the end of one’s line: and then the cautious hauling of it in, and the careful laying of it out? Alas, laid on the grass how small, how insignificant this thought of mine looked; the sort of fish that a good fisherman puts back into the water so that it may grow fatter and be one day worth cooking and eating.

But the thought was fish enough to excite Woolf, to set her “walking with extreme rapidity across a grass plot.” But “Instantly a man’s figure rose to intercept me…. he was a Beadle; I was a woman. This was the turf; there was the path. Only the Fellows and Scholars are allowed here; the gravel is the place for me.” Quick to obey, Woolf resumed the path — but the interruption “had sent my little fish into hiding. What idea it had been that had sent me so audaciously trespassing I could not now remember.”

One could accurately enough describe A Room of One’s Own as an attempt to recover that fish so frustratingly driven away by the abrupt appearance of the monitory Beadle. That small event is, of course, deeply and intrinsically connected to the things she will say about women and fiction. For the Beadles of the world have a great deal to say about whether women write fiction at all — they exert force (even if only rhetorically) on women’s bodies and therefore on women’s thoughts. “The book has somehow to be adapted to the body, and at a venture one would say that women’s books should be shorter, more concentrated, than those of men, and framed so that they do not need long hours of steady and uninterrupted work. For interruptions there will always be.”

Interruptions there will always be — Beadles, literal or metaphorical, there will always be. So To the Lighthouse (200 pages or so) rather than The Brothers Karamazov; Pride and Prejudice (300 pages) rather than War and Peace. An intriguing argument, though perhaps Woolf concedes too much. Half a century before she wrote those words, Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda had somehow emerged, after all — though here, as elsewhere in her work, Woolf is strangely reluctant to acknowledge George Eliot’s achievement. And perhaps she should be more hopeful about a future when women, women who have rooms of their own, will be interrupted no more often than men. A decade after Woolf’s speculations on the future of women’s writing, a woman named Rebecca West would produce one of the very greatest books of the twentieth century, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, which is even longer than War and Peace.

But still: surely it’s true that “the book must be adapted to the body”; that interruptions happen to bodies, or to people with bodies; that what we write is intertwined with the frequency and nature of our interruptions. Perhaps we might also infer that people who suffer many interruptions ought to be writing essays: for essays can (as A Room of One’s Own does) record those interruptions and make them into art. So Kafka’s famous parable: “Leopards break into the temple and drink to the dregs what was in the sacrificial pitchers; this is repeated over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance, and it becomes part of the ceremony.” A person whose writing can usefully incorporate the interrupting leopards is a natural essayist.

A few years ago the science fiction writer Cory Doctorow commented, “The biggest impediment to concentration is your computer’s ecosystem of interruption technologies.” We all know what he means — and, if we are honest, we know that we choose to enable those technologies. We are our own Beadles. We invite all available leopards to drink from our chalices. We’re like the women Woolf talks about who needed desperately to acquire rooms of their own, but as soon as we get such rooms we contrive ways for them to be invaded. To us, essays are starting to feel as expansive as three-decker novels: we default to tweeting, and when we can manage long periods of sustained concentration — say, ten minutes or so — we craft blog posts.

I exaggerate, a bit. Novels are still being written, some of them quite large. But I can’t help thinking that the essay, with its brevity, its tolerance of shifting patterns and values, ought to be the genre of our time. We should see it as a reservoir capable of holding a world of images and ideas.

But this is unlikely. The essay has always been the neglected stepchild of the literary genres. It is what writers settle for when nothing more attractive presents itself. In a letter Saul Bellow wrote in his old age, to his fellow novelist Cynthia Ozick, he lamented that he had “become such a solitary, and not in the Aristotelian sense: not a beast, not a god. Rather, a loner troubled by longings, incapable of finding a suitable language and despairing at the impossibility of composing messages in a playable key.” Near the end of his life, he thought, “I have only the cranky idiom of my books — the letters-in-general of an occult personality, a desperately odd somebody who has, as a last resort, invented a technique of self-representation.” This description of novels as “the letters-in-general of an occult personality” makes me wonder whether Bellow is one of those figures — there are many in the history of literary writing — who was really not suited to writing novels but wrote novels because novels were the thing to write. Consider, for instance, the famous letters Moses Herzog writes to dead philosophers. They are just brilliant little self-contained torpedos; they don’t need Moses Herzog. Bellow thought he had to come up with Herzog, and make things happen to him, in order to provide a plausible context for these letters, but he was wrong. They would have been just fine, better maybe, as “letters-in-general,” or (it amounts to the same thing) essays.

Similarly, by a long shot Walker Percy’s best book is Lost in the Cosmos, a comic Kierkegaardian satire with a forty-page excursus on semiotics (a lucid one, too) stuck in the middle. The book is basically a series of wonderfully crazy essays that spin off fictional cadenzas from time to time — in just the way that at a certain point in A Room of One’s Own Virginia Woolf improvises a moving speculation about Shakespeare’s imaginary sister. I wish Bellow had written a book like Lost in the Cosmos, on a grander scale, maybe: a big letter-in-general that dispensed with the trappings of fiction and just let that style, that extraordinary Bellovian voice, carry itself and us along. Why didn’t he? Because he lived in a time when novels were what mattered: to be an essayist would be to abandon any aspirations to recognizable greatness. It’s impossible to imagine an essayist winning the Nobel Prize for Literature.

So essays hide in novels. There must be twenty fine essays in Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain, all disguised as speeches by various characters. And Robert Musil’s unfinished masterpiece The Man without Qualities might best be seen as a vast ramifying network of essays and commentary on essayistic thought — and this is indeed the precise reason why Musil did not finish, could not have finished, the book. To finish it would have been to pretend that it was a novel. But Musil makes clear, within The Man without Qualities itself, that his deepest concern is to produce an exposition and defense of a certain philosophy — or a certain way of life — that he calls “essayism.” Just as one might write an essay about a work of fiction, Musil writes a work of fiction about the essay, or the act of essaying.

“The accepted translation of ‘essay’ as ‘attempt,’” Musil writes,

contains only vaguely the essential allusion to the literary model, for an essay is not a provisional or incidental expression of a conviction capable of being exposed as an error (the only ones of that kind are those articles or treatises, chips from the scholar’s workbench, with which the learned entertain their special public); an essay is rather the unique and unalterable form assumed by a man’s inner life in a decisive thought… . There have been more than a few such essayists, masters of the inner hovering life, but there would be no point in naming them. Their domain lies between religion and knowledge, between example and doctrine, between amor intellectualis and poetry; they are saints with and without religion, and sometimes they are also simply men on an adventure who have gone astray.

I want to place special emphasis on this one idea: an essay is rather the unique and unalterable form assumed by a man’s inner life in a decisive thought. As an example, consider Virginia Woolf’s decision to write a book in order to explain how she came to the “decisive thought” that a woman who wants to write fiction needs £500 a year and a room of her own. It is intrinsic to Woolf’s authorial modesty to say, or imply, that she took this path because it was easier than coming up with a clean, pure nugget of truth that we might set upon our mantlepiece; but in fact what she chose to do was almost infinitely more difficult. “Unfortunately,” Musil writes, “nothing is so hard to achieve as a literary representation of a man thinking.”

Therefore, Musil concludes, a serious attempt at this task is a very rigorous enterprise, though it is rarely recognized as such. He once asked, “Is the essay something left over in an area where one can work precisely?” For this is what many people think: that one could but precise about one’s subject if one had the disciplined intelligence, but one chooses instead to draft a frivolous little bagatelle. But what if, Musil continues, the essay is rather “the strictest form attainable in an area where one cannot work precisely”?

Let me return to my opening sentence: “The essay is a representational genre, and what it represents is the movement of the mind across ideas, experiences, and sensations.” This thinking about thinking is enormously difficult, because its target is always moving. I’m reminded here of Kierkegaard’s complaint about retrospection: “It is quite true what philosophy says: that life must be understood backwards. But then one forgets the other principle: that it must be lived forwards. Which principle, the more one thinks it through, ends exactly with the thought that temporal life can never properly be understood because I can at no instant find complete rest in which to adopt the position: backwards.”

To be in motion oneself, trying to fix one’s attention on something also in motion, something that’s a part of you (or that you’re a part of), twisting your head to peer behind even as your feet propel you forward … surely this is a recipe for confusion. But confusion is not always to be shunned. As Iris Murdoch once wrote, “Coherence is not necessarily good, and one must question its cost. Better sometimes to remain confused.” To be in the midst of one’s own mind, to be making one’s way by dead reckoning, to be looking around always for orientation or distraction, does not lead to coherence, but it does tend to produce surprise. And often that surprise is productive.

One might think that “wayfaring” is rather too dignified and directional a word for such ceaseless mental movement. Earlier I compared it to Brownian motion, which is the textbook example of physical randomness. And after all, Montaigne wrote when he was virtually inventing this genre, “I cannot keep my subject still. It goes along befuddled and staggering, with a natural drunkenness. I take it in this condition, just as it is at the moment I give my attention to it. I do not portray being; I portray passing.”

And yet, stagger drunkenly though he may, Montaigne discovers over time that his travels take in in a generally discernible direction. He reports, in this same essay, that he “rarely repents” — an admission not as damning as it sounds, because he also explains that he has learned how rare genuine repentance is, as opposed to those changes that are brought on poor health and old age. “God must touch our hearts,” he writes. “Our conscience must reform by itself through the strengthening of our reason, not through the weakening of our appetites… . What I owe to the favor of my colic, is neither chastity nor temperance.” Later, in the final essay, “Of experience,” he eagerly and affectionately describes the kind of life he has come over the years most to admire: “The most beautiful lives, to my mind, are those that conform to the common human pattern, with order, but without miracle and without eccentricity.” He does not awake in the morning with a completely different set of preferences and beliefs that he had possessed when going to bed the night before. He has gotten somewhere. He has made his way.

This was not the achievement of a single snapshot, one instant captured, even if captured perfectly: like any good navigator, Montaigne took his bearings frequently and recorded them with care. Eventually the points on the graph stopped looking random and began to assume a shape. That shape got clearer over time. It wasn’t Brownian motion after all. This is why we need essayists, not just essays. Truth told about a life, all things considered, matters more than truth told about a moment. Honest self-description today is good; honest self-description over a lifetime is invaluable — and revelatory. If we could see the direction in which we are trending, if we could see that we are indeed inscribing something like a path through life, and not just moving randomly like motes of pollen in a glass of water, we might not be consoled. But better to discern what is the case, to be what Musil calls “a master of the inner hovering life.” “It is an absolute perfection and virtually divine,” Montaigne wrote in one of his last sentences, “to know how to enjoy our being rightfully.” This is just what the wayfarer seeks to learn.

Rita Blanca National Grasslands in the Texas panhandle; photo by Sean Fitzgerald. Larger photo here.

BRB, I gotta take all these unused minutes to the

My old friend Noah Millman with a moving meditation on his own first name – and on “the crooked timber of humanity.”

one cheer for "negative experience"

Nicola Griffith:

Once you have the reader’s empathy, though, you must keep it. You must persuade the reader to trust you enough to lower their guard, to let go of the constant low-level self-protection most of us experience in the real world. This means you must be very, very careful how you handle negative experience. Every reader is different, and you can’t please everyone, but my personal bias (and I’m far from alone in this), is extreme antipathy to wanton cruelty towards helpless living things. If you make me empathize with a dog or child or young woman, and then torment them using visceral language, I will experience visceral revulsion, throw the book at the wall, and never read anything you write again. I won’t trust you.

I feel exactly the same way about the same things, and yet I am reluctant to endorse the prescription Griffith makes. For one thing, the category of “negative experience” is so vast and amorphous that, especially when you consider the obvious fact that, as Griffith says, “every reader is different,” it’s hard to think of anything that would clearly escape it. Reading about a happy family might be a “negative experience” for someone whose family is unhappy. 

No, I’m inclined to say to writers, Don’t be careful about portraying negative experience or any other kind of experience. If Shakespeare and Dostoevsky and Toni Morrison had been careful, we wouldn’t have King Lear, The Brothers Karamazov, and Beloved — three works that have been enormously painful to many readers. But that pain hasn’t always been bad; sometimes, for some readers, I am inclined to say for most readers, it has been necessary. 

I just don’t think we need more books written by people who walk on eggshells for fear of offending or hurting. A world in which some readers are wounded by what they read is not an ideal one, but a world in which writers self-censor to avoid disturbing those most prone to disturbance would be worse. There are other and better ways to protect endangered people than muzzling our writers. 


UPDATE: One more point. Griffith’s essay, like much writing on arts and ideas these days, operates from the assumption that any given reader’s vulnerabilities and sensitivities are fixed, unchangeable. The idea that a sensitive reader could become less sensitive, or could adapt to his or her sensitivities in some constructive way, is not on the table. I think it ought to be on the table. 

the nature of the transaction

Ross Douthat addressing prospective donors to universities, the kind who keep giving to Harvard and Yale: 

If you want actual influence over American academic life, you’re just much better off finding a smaller or poorer school where your money will be welcomed, your opportunities to effect real transformation will be ample and your millions can build something dynamic or beautiful without always fighting through the thicket of powerful interest groups that grows up around powerful institutions. And to harp again on a frequent theme, if you’re absurdly, obscenely rich and care about higher education, you should Google “Leland Stanford” and then go and do likewise. 

Ross goes on to talk about donors who are motivated by the warm, fuzzy memories of their undergraduate days at such institutions — and tells them that they need to get over that — but I wonder: How many big donors are in fact thinking of their Happy College Days? Maybe they were happy, maybe they weren’t; maybe they appreciated the education they received, but more likely they don’t think about that at all. And how many genuinely desire to influence American academic life? Almost none, I suspect. I tend to think that the situation is more purely transactional: 

  • Assuming that these donors did attend an elite university, attending an elite university was for them a ticket to social capital and financial capital; 
  • Having acquired more financial capital than they could ever spend in a dozen lifetimes, they nevertheless find themselves longing for ever more social capital, more cultural approval, more cachet
  • And so they contribute to the universities that can give them that, which is to say, the most elite universities — no lesser school can provide what they’re willing to pay for. (How many of them have even had one instant’s thought about the future students they could help along the way? You don’t get that rich by thinking about other people.) 

Maybe in some general and theoretical sense they’d like to have influence over those universities, and maybe they complain when they discover that they don’t have it, but that’s like discovering that there’s no valet parking at the elegant restaurant where you’ve booked a table: annoying, but hey, you’re not there for the parking. 

FWIW, one of my favorite things I’ve published in recent years is this reflection on the big Blake exhibition at the Tate Gallery.

would it kill you to allow the occasional German word

I’ve made a case for reading the news less often.

periodicity

This piece from the Dispatch (possibly paywalled) on how The New York Times misled its readers with an overly “Hamas-friendly” headline makes a valid point, I guess — but I think much of the problem here is baked-in to minute-by-minute journalism. You don’t have to be a hard-core opponent of Israel to get a headline like that wrong — in the heat of the moment even a slight lean towards the people living in Gaza might be enough to influence your headline. If you have to post something on your website, and post it right now, you’ll not be consistently judicious and fair-minded. 

[UPDATE: The Times has published an apology.] 

I didn’t know that the Times had perpetrated this headline because any political crisis strengthens me in the habits I have been trying to cultivate for some years now: to watch no TV news at all — that part’s easy, I haven’t seen TV news in the past thirty years, except when I’m in an airport — and to read news on a once-a-week rather than a several-times-a-day basis. My primary way to get political news, national and international, is to read the Economist when it shows up at my house, which it does on Saturday or Monday. (I don’t keep the Economist app on my phone.) I have eliminated political sites from my RSS feed, and only happened upon the Dispatch report when I was looking for something else at the site. 

The more unstable a situation is, the more rapidly it changes, the less valuable minute-by-minute reporting is. I don’t know what happened to the hospital in Gaza, but if I wait until the next issue of the Economist shows up I will be better informed about it than people who have been rage-refreshing their browser windows for the past several days, and I will have suffered considerably less emotional stress. 

It’s important to remember this: businesses that rely on constant online or televisual engagement — social media platforms, TV news channels, news websites — make bank from our rage. They have every incentive, whether they are aware of it or not, to inflame our passions. (This is why pundits who are always wrong can keep their jobs: they don’t have to be right, they just have to be skilled at stimulating the collective amygdala.) As the intervals of production increase — from hourly to daily to weekly to monthly to annually — the incentives shift away from being merely provocative and towards being more informative. Rage-baiting never disappears altogether, but books aren’t well-suited to it: even the angriest book has to have passages of relative calm, which allows the reader to stop and think — a terrible consequence for the dedicated rage-baiter. 

“We have a responsibility to be informed!” people shout. Well, maybe, though I have in the past made the case for idiocy. But let me waive the point, and say: If you’re reading the news several times a day, you’re not being informed, you’re being stimulated. Try giving yourself a break from it. Look at this stuff at wider intervals, and in between sessions, give yourself time to think and assess.


UPDATE 2023–10–23: One tiny result of the Israel/Gaza nightmare, for me, is that it has revealed to me those among the writers I follow via RSS who are prone to making uninformed, dimwitted political pronouncements. Those feeds I have deleted without hesitation. 

I’m really worried about Bandcamp, which is a unique and probably irreplaceable service. At this point, there’s one thing we all ought to have learned: when the founders of a service or app we love sell it, that means it’s time for us to get out. It will not last in the form we love. Key quote from the piece:

Cultural theorist Cory Doctorow coined the term ‘enshittification’ to describe the agonizing process by which online platforms shift their focus from end users to maximizing value for their shareholders. It’s a crudely effective concept capable of capturing everything from the declining quality of Google’s search results to the way your Instagram feed is full of Reels you never asked to see. (Let’s not even get started on the rot at the heart of whatever Twitter is now.) When Bandcamp’s founders sold the company to Epic, that should have been the first sign that the platform belonged to someone other than its users. Songtradr’s layoffs and promises of synergy with its music licensing business are the next indicator that the ugly specter of enshittification may be nigh. The saddest thing is, aside from a benevolent billionaire sweeping in and buying up the site, or building out an alternative, there are no easy answers here. It’s another reminder that the independent music ecosystem is far more fragile than anyone would like to admit.